The widespread tendency, even within AI, to anthropomorphize machines makes it easier to convince us of their intelligence. How can any putative demonstration of intelligence in machines be trusted if the AI researcher readily succumbs to make-believe? This is (what I shall call) the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. I argue that the Turing test provides a solution. This paper illustrates the phenomenon of misplaced anthropomorphism and presents a new perspective on Turing's imitation game. It also examines the role of the Turing test in relation to the current dispute between human-level AI and 'mindless intelligence'.
Some theorists even argue that Turing did not intend to propose a test at all. Aaron Sloman, for example, claims that Turing was 'far too intelligent to do any such thing' and that this widespread misinterpretation of 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' has led to 'huge amounts of wasted effort' discussing the purely 'mythical' Turing test. 10 According to Sloman, Turing introduced the imitation game, 'not in order to give a criterion for thinking or for intelligence', but to provide 'a basis for attacking arguments' against the possibility that a computer could succeed in the game.
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However, Turing did make it clear that he was proposing a test of intelligence in machines. In his famous 1950 paper he referred to the imitation game as a 'test' and as providing a 'criterion for "thinking" ' (he even said that his opponent Geoffrey Jefferson probably 'would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test'). 12 In his 1952 radio broadcast, 'Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said To Think?', Turing said 'I would like to suggest a particular kind of test that one might apply to a machine'. He described the imitation game and continued:
Well, that's my test. Of course I am not saying at present either that machines really could pass the test, or that they couldn't. My suggestion is just that this is the question we should discuss. It's not the same as 'Do machines think?', but it seems near enough for our present purpose, and raises much the same difficulties. 13 Turing also made it clear that he introduced the imitation game in order to illustrate his approach to intelligence-rather than, as Sloman claims, to make a technological prediction or rebut objections to machine intelligence. Turing first described the computer-imitates-human game in 'Intelligent Machinery' (his 1948 report for the National Physical Laboratory) as a 'little experiment' (which, he said, he had actually conducted) based on his thesis that '[t]he extent to which we regard something as behaving in an intelligent manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of the object under consideration'.
14 I shall argue that Turing's test is of considerable importance for AI today-and not solely as an intriguing thought experiment or as part of a far-off scientific goal. Advocates of both human-level AI and of mindless intelligence face the question: how do we test for intelligence in machines? Both also face a difficult problem that results from the human tendency to anthropomorphize artificial systems. This tendency makes it too easy to convince us of the intelligence, human-level or otherwise, of a machine. Turing provided a test of intelligence in machines that solves this problem.
Anthropomorphism in AI
Computer scientists often complain that the public expects intelligent androids to appear any day. Yet science fiction and make-believe can also be found within AI-even at its very beginnings. 15 Turing compared what he called his 'child-machine'
to Helen Keller, said that the machine could not 'be sent to school without the other children making excessive fun of it' but it would have 'homework', and he suggested that 'the education of the machine should be entrusted to some highly competent schoolmaster'. 16 Turing was discussing his 'P-type' unorganized machines (modified Turing machines, with no tape and with 'pain' and 'pleasure' inputs). 17 These existed only as 'paper machines'-simulations of machine behaviour by a human being using paper and pencil 18 -but Turing anthropomorphized them nonetheless.
Illustrative cases of anthropomorphism also include Valentino Braitenberg's descriptions of his robot vehicles. These machines are said to dream, sleepwalk, have free will, and 'ponder over their decisions'; they are 'inquisitive', 'optimistic', and 'friendly'. They even have the 'a priori concept of 2-dimensional space'. 19 21 Daniel Dennett said that Cog is to have an 'infancy and childhood' and will be designed 'to want to keep its mother's face in view'. Cog must somehow delight in learning, abhor error, strive for novelty, recognize progress. It must be vigilant in some regards, curious in others, and deeply unwilling to engage in self-destructive activity. While we are at it, we might as well try to make it crave human praise and company, and even exhibit a sense of humour.
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Often the researchers building social robots such as Cog (and especially 'face' robots) attempt to avoid anthropomorphism -for example, by using scare-quotes or other notational devices when describing a face robot's 'emotion' system, and by claiming that the robot has mere analogues of human emotions. 23 In these cases they typically deny that the robot has-'real' or human-emotions. 24 (This denial need not presuppose a definition of 'emotion'. To use a famous example, we do not need a definition of a 'game' to be justified in saying that football is a game and dermatology is not. Nor can we provide one 25 : instead we use prototypes and exemplars. Likewise, we do not need a definition of 'emotion' to be justified in saying that you have emotions and SOZZY does not.) Nevertheless, the same researchers who deny that their robots have emotions attribute expressive behaviours to the machines literally and without qualification; in this way they unwittingly anthropomorphize the machines. Kismet, for example, is said (without scare-quotes) to have 'a smile on [its] face', to 'frown', and to have a 'happy and interested expression' and a 'sorrowful expression'. 26 Kismet is also said to 'glance towards' a toy, 'look in another direction', and 'settl[e] its gaze on the person's face'. 27 This is not to claim merely that the robot has certain physical configurations or behaviours. Smiling, for example, is a complex conventional gesture. A facial display is a smile only if it has a certain meaning-the meaning that distinguishes a smile from a human grimace or facial tic, and from a chimpanzee's bared-teeth display. Similarly, saying that Kismet has a happy expression (rather than a 'happy expression') is claiming that the meaning of the robot's 'facial' display is happiness (and not mere 'happiness'). In saying that Kismet smiles and frowns (as opposed to saying merely that its facial display is, like an emoticon or photograph, a representation of a smile or frown), Kismet's creators are claiming that the robot has a certain communicative intent-the intent possessed by creatures that smile, namely human beings. In the 1970s Drew McDermott ridiculed the use of 'wishful mnemonics' to refer to programs and data structures. He said that, if the AI programmer calls the main loop of his program "UNDERSTAND", he is (until proven innocent) merely begging the question. He may mislead a lot of people, most prominently himself, and enrage a lot of others. What he should do instead is refer to this main loop as "G0034", and see if he can convince himself or anyone else that G0034 implements some part of understanding. 28 McDermott's aim was to eliminate the use of wishful mnemonics: he said, 'If we are to retain any credibility, this should stop'. His recommendation to the 'disciplined' AI researcher is to use 'colourless' or 'sanitized' terms-those with a 'humble, technical meaning'. 29 Anthropomorphism in AI goes far beyond wishful mnemonics, though. Some of the examples given above could be seen as mnemonics; for example, Turing's 'pain' or 'punishment' signal could instead be referred to as a 'cancellation' instruction (it cancels tentative entries in the P-type's machine table). In contrast, the claim that a Braitenberg machine has the 'a priori concept of 2-dimensional space' cannot be cashed out in this way. Likewise, although some instances of anthropomorphism in AI are question-begging, as McDermott points out, other examples give rise to a different problem. Describing SOZZY as friendly is to engage in make-believe and make a plainly false, rather than a question-begging, claim. 30 McDermott requires that AI researchers, before using psychological terms, demonstrate that their programs do implement psychological properties. But how can a researcher's effort to 'convince himself or anyone else' of intelligence in machines be trusted if the researcher readily succumbs to anthropomorphism and make-believe-ascribing joy to a robot vacuum cleaner, for example? This is (what I shall call) the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. This is not the traditional metaphysical problem of the relation between the physical and the mental, nor the ethical question of how we should treat artificial agents; nor does it assume that humans are exceptional. And it poses a different problem from that identified by McDermott. The forensic problem of anthropomorphism is this: anthropomorphizing risks introducing bias (in favour of the machine) into judgements of intelligence in machines-unless the risk is mitigated, these judgements are suspect.
McDermott's prescription for the 'disease' of wishful mnemonics is abstinence. 31 Yet fiction can be useful (the centre of gravity and light travels in a straight line are useful fictions in physics), and researchers in social robotics point to advantages in anthropomorphizing machines-for example, it facilitates human-machine interaction and machine learning. Moreover, anthropomorphism may be, not eliminable, but natural and inevitable (even McDermott, at the very same time as ridiculing wishful mnemonics, calls GPS a 'particularly stupid' program). 32 The forensic problem of anthropomorphism requires that anthropomorphism be managed, rather than purged. Turing's imitation game, I shall argue, achieves this.
A new perspective on the Turing test
Turing was well aware of how easy it is to anthropomorphize an artificial system; he said that playing chess against even a paper machine gives 'a definite feeling that one is pitting one's wits against something alive'. 33 (The 'little experiment' that, Turing indicated, he had actually performed two or so years before publishing 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' was a chess-playing imitation game, involving a judge and two contestants-a human player and a paper machine. 34 )
It is impossible now to determine exactly why Turing designed the imitation game as he did. However, the design of the game does avoid the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. This is because the game includes both a disincentive to anthropomorphize and a control to screen for any anthropomorphic bias in favour of the machine.
The disincentive to anthropomorphize results from the fact that imitation-game interrogators risk making a real and readily-exposed error-misidentifying a computer as a human being. The likelihood of this mistake can only be increased by the tendency to anthropomorphize; hence there is a disincentive to anthropomorphism built into Turing's game. This disincentive can be seen at work in the Loebner Prize Contest in Artificial Intelligence. Judges in this competition are suspicious, even hostile-rather than behaving like the humans playing with Kismet or chatting with Eliza. For example, they use nonsense utterances (e.g. 'Wljso lwjejdo wleje elwjeo wjeol, isn't it?'), deliberate misspellings ('what do you think of the whether?'), slang ('Yo, whassup?'), and questions probing common-sense knowledge ('I drove here this morning. Which side of the road should I have driven on?') in order to identify the machine. 35 Prior to 2004, the Loebner contest differed from the test in Turing's 1950 paper, in that it did not have the form of a 3-player game. Instead each judge interviewed each contestant individually (there were several judges and several contestants); the judges were unaware of the ratio of computer to human contestants. Judges in this 2-player form of the game appeared to behave strategically, to avoid error: in the 2000 contest, for example, no judge classed a computer as a human-in fact, in 10 interviews a human was classed as a computer. 36 In the 2003 competition, no judge classed a machine as 'definitely a human', and in 4 interviews a human was classed as 'definitely a machine'. 37 The judges refused to anthropomorphize, even when interviewing human beings.
Turing's 3-player imitation game (as formulated in 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence') contains an additional means of managing bias resulting from anthropomorphism. This game is a blind controlled trial of a machine's ability to answer questions, in a human-like manner, on a wide range of topics. Including a human contestant in simultaneous interviews turns the tendency to anthropomorphize into a controlled variable. We may assume that any tendency the interrogator has to anthropomorphize an unseen contestant is independent of the actual identity of the contestant. 38 The consequence is that the interrogator's tendency to anthropomorphize does not advantage the machine. On this new understanding of Turing's test, a popular objection to the test is wrong-headed. Kenneth Ford and Patrick
Hayes, for example, claim that the test is 'a poorly designed experiment . . . depending too much on the subjectivity of the judge'. 39 Likewise, the philosopher Ned Block asserts that the test makes whether or not a machine thinks 'depend on how gullible human interrogators tend to be'. 40 This criticism of Turing's test is influential but gets things back-to-front. The imitation game mitigates anthropomorphic bias introduced by 'gullible' judges; it is a well-designed experiment.
Mindless intelligence and Turing's test
Mindless intelligence, in Pollack's sense, seems to be intelligence without symbols. It is plain that his main target is the physical symbol system hypothesis; he describes Lisp interpreters, symbols, grammars, and logic or inference engines as 'the accoutrements of cognition'. A 'mindless process', we may infer, will have none of these.
In this sense of 'mindless', it is in fact an error to oppose human-level intelligence and mindless intelligence; it is an entirely open question whether a mindless machine can achieve human-level intelligence. In consequence, there is a role for the Turing test as a criterion of human-level mindless intelligence in machines (the imitation game does not test for any particular cognitive architecture).
Pollack, of course, calls for computer science to stop chasing human-level intelligence-the 'same old AI goals' are, he says, 'red herrings that promise the practically impossible'. But why is human-level AI impossible? Pollack's reason is that '[s]ymbolic conscious reasoning is . . . a myth'. However, this is to identify the goal of building a human-level intelligence with that of building a symbolic mind-and this is a mistake, since human-level AI can exploit different architectures. 41 (Turing himself recommended trying both symbolic and behaviour-based approaches. 42 ) In fact, Pollack's call for mindless intelligence presupposes a criterion of human-level intelligence in machines, since he claims that dynamical physical processes can become 'more intelligent than' a smart adult human. Turing shared several of the goals of mindless intelligence. 43 What is now called 'Turing Test AI' was not his only aim;
his research was wide-ranging. 44 Crucially, the common assertion that the Turing test 'assumes that human thought is the final, highest pinnacle of thinking against which all others must be judged' is mistaken. 45 Turing recognized that his test measures human-like intelligence and that an intelligent non-human system might behave very differently. 46 His hope was that the imitation game would provide an existence proof of the hypothesis that machines can think. If a machine were to do well in the imitation game (played numerous times, with different interrogators, and on diverse topics), wouldn't that be a convincing demonstration of artificial intelligence-even to the die-hard naysayer?
Blockheads, zombies, and other objections
Any argument for the importance of Turing's test must address standard objections to the test. The most influential philosophical objection is: if a machine does well in the imitation game, this demonstrates merely that the machine behaves as if it is intelligent (or thinks)-not that it is really intelligent. 47 Why say this? One reason proposed is that manifestly unintelligent programs can pass the test. Some critics point to the success of primitive programs in Loebner's contests, especially the early competitions. 48 Yet these fail as counterexamples to Turing's test. Loebner's test is much easier than Turing's (for example, in the protocol for scoring the test); the early competitions also restricted the topics of the questions and forbade the judges to use tricks-unlike Turing's test.
To produce an effective counterexample, critics must invent hypothetical entities. For example, a blockhead (after Ned Block) is a hypothetical program that incorporates a vast look-up table; according to Block, the program he calls 'Aunt Bubbles' can do well in the imitation game, but has the intelligence only of a 'jukebox'. 49 However, this famous counterexample does not work. 50 In the real world no look-up table device would fool a Turing-test interrogator; given the constraints of processing speed and storage capacity, the candidate would take too long to answer the questions. Block acknowledges that a device like Aunt Bubbles is 'only logically possible, not physically possible'-the machine is, he admits, 'too vast to exist'. In his view this does not matter: 'because we are considering a proposed definition of intelligence that is supposed to capture the concept of intelligence, conceptual possibility will do the job'. 51 However, Turing did not use his test as a definition of (i.e., a logically necessary and sufficient condition for) intelligence. 52 It is perverse to insist on this interpretation of the test, in the face of Turing's saying (in his 1952 radio broadcast) 'I don't want to give a definition of thinking', 53 his acknowledgement (in his 1950 paper) that success in the test is not a necessary condition of intelligence, and his remarks (in his 1952 broadcast) demonstrating his concern with real-world machines-machines that can solve problems, he said, 'within a reasonable time'. 54 This last excludes look-up table devices of the sort described by Block and others.
Several critics of the Turing test argue as follows: 'real' intelligence (or thinking) essentially involves consciousness, and the imitation game cannot test for this. 55 John Searle, for example, appears to take this view; he claims that Turing's test aims to detect 'the presence of mind' but fails, since it tests only 'external behaviour'. 56 This criticism can be made out using a zombie thought experiment. A zombie is a hypothetical entity that lacks all conscious awareness (i.e., qualitative awareness or 'feeling'), but is otherwise indistinguishable from a human being. The objection runs: a zombie could pass Turing's test, but isn't it obvious that such a creature does not really think? However, this objection begs two crucial questions. First, it simply assumes that thinking essentially involves consciousness-ignoring the fact that humans have nonconscious thoughts. Second, it assumes that a zombie would do well in the imitation game. But it may be that only an entity capable of conscious thought will pass Turing's test. This is an entirely open question, which is not settled by the fact that we can imagine a zombie passing the test (if indeed we can imagine this).
Turning from philosophical to scientific and engineering objections to Turing's test, many of these do not attack the test itself (for example, those objections quoted at the beginning of this paper). Some criticize the use of the test to stipulate a core goal for AI (namely, the imitation of human performance). Others criticize attempts by researchers working in Good Old-Fashioned AI to build machines that will pass the test. And the true target of some other objections is Loebner's annual contest, on the ground that it encourages programmers to use tricks. All these criticisms could be conceded without any damage to Turing's test.
Those scientific and engineering objections that attack the test directly make, in effect, two related criticisms. The first is: the test fails to assist researchers to build a thinking machine (let alone a mindless 'insect' or an 'intelligence amplifier' for humans). 57 For example, some critics argue that the test is too difficult and fails to provide a practical way forward for AI. 58 Turing recognized the difficulty in constructing a machine that would succeed in the game; in his 1952 broadcast he predicted that it would be 'at least 100 years' before a machine 'stand[s] any chance [of passing the test] with no questions barred'. 59 Nevertheless, if AI researchers are to build a thinking machine, they must have some criterion of when they have reached this goal. Turing's test provides such a criterion. The second criticism is: the Turing test fails to assist researchers to understand-that is, construct a computational theory of-intelligence. For example, some critics argue that the focus on human-like systems will not help us to understand intelligence in a generic sense. 60 63 However, even if the concept of intelligence is fuzzy, the imitation game can be used as a test of (human-like) intelligence; this is because, as Turing said, we cannot conclude from a contestant's failing to do well in the game that the contestant is not intelligent. The complaint that the imitation game does not help researchers to theorize about intelligence overlooks Turing's own very different approach to intelligence. Sloman, for example, claims that a 'deep' understanding of human-level intelligence requires that we identify the mechanisms underlying intelligent human behaviour as solutions to problems posed in human evolutionary development (clearly the imitation game does not provide this). 64 In contrast, Turing said in his 1952 broadcast, 'As soon as one can see the cause and effect working themselves out in the brain, one regards it as not being thinking, but a sort of unimaginative donkey-work'. 65 In his view, the ordinary concept of intelligence is linked, not to the notion of underlying mechanisms, but to the notion of people's responses in specified conditions (see Section 1). Intelligence in this sense cannot be understood by the sort of investigation Sloman proposes-but it can be tested in the imitation game, which explores the human's response to the machine in carefully circumscribed circumstances.
'Intelligence is in the eye of the observer'
If AI does abandon the Turing test, what will take its place? One popular approach (with some similarity to Turing's own view) is simply to say that 'intelligence is in the eye of the observer'. Rodney Brooks, for example, uses these very words (and Pollack's definition of 'mindless intelligence' specifies that it is intelligent behaviour ascribed by an observer). 66 This approach raises in a graphic way the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. Brooks claims that 'it is only an external observer that has anything to do with cognition, by way of attributing cognitive abilities to a system that works well in the world'. 67 This recalls Dennett's classic stipulation that 'a particular thing is an intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict its behavior'. 68 These claims raise the possibility that any machine is an intentional system, just because the observer anthropomorphizes the machine. How is this possibility to be avoided? Dennett has proposed that an observer is justified in treating a machine as an intentional system where it is useful ('convenient, explanatory, pragmatically necessary for prediction') to do so. 69 Brooks has also suggested that, if the illusion of genuine communication with a machine is shattered less and less, the machine should be counted as a thinking thing.
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Yet humans may always find it 'convenient' to adopt the intentional stance when giving common-sense accounts of a machine's behaviour. The extravagance with which even AI researchers anthropomorphize machines suggest that Dennett's condition (that the observer find the intentional stance useful) is too easily satisfied. The same problem arises for Brooks's suggestion. Many researchers argue that human beings have an evolved tendency to personalize the world (we even see faces in the clouds) 71 ; if so, the illusion of communication with a machine may be too readily generated.
In an ideal world the forensic problem of anthropomorphism would not arise. Such a world would include an ideal observer-a spectator without any inclination to misplaced anthropomorphism, or who is able (despite this inclination) to make unbiased decisions. However, in the real world ideal observers are hard to find, if not impossible. Turing's imitation game solves the problem without invoking an ideal observer.
Conclusion
Irrespective of the theoretical merits of Turing's test, there are the familiar economic arguments against employing it. David Waltz, for example, recently claimed that in the future 'few agencies or industries are likely to fund research whose primary goal is to pass some variant of the Turing Test'. 72 Yet even if Waltz is correct, those researchers who do want to develop machines with human-level intelligence will require some standard for determining success. Without a criterion of human-level intelligence in machines, it is impossible even to theorize about building such devices. Moreover, building human-level AI requires a test of intelligence in machines that is not undermined by our tendency to anthropomorphize. The Turing test is anthropomorphism-proofed.
